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Virtually every practicing attorney and legal academic first encountered
uniform statutes when studying the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in
law school. Yet the UCC's widespread acceptance and periodic renewal are
not the legacy of most uniform law ventures. Taking a harder look at the
uniform statutory process and its products may allow participants in a new
effort to set realistic goals, or at least assist them in anticipating problems
they are likely to face.
This Article offers an overview and some pointers regarding the distinct
challenge of developing a successful uniform mediation law.1 It discusses
problems that stem from the private nature of the uniform act drafting
operation, and also from the diversity of political and legislative settings in
which a uniform statutory solution is evaluated. The use of mediation now
permeates multiple public and private settings, and the related body of
mediation law has experienced vast growth. 2 At the outset of a long-term
project to develop a uniform mediation act, it would be premature if not
foolhardy to prescribe a pathway for success. I do, however, start from a
belief that the legislative process possesses a certain coherence and that
aspects of the anticipated journey may be chartable at least in broad terms.
In particular, the journey may be affected by understanding which
rationales best support a uniform law approach for mediation, by raising
questions as to how one measures the success of such an approach, and by
becoming aware of major structural or procedural obstacles that may be
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valuable comments and suggestions. Kathleen Lyon provided exceptional research
assistance. Craig Byrnes and the College of Law Library research staff also furnished
fine research support, and Michele Newton contributed her customary careful typing of
the manuscript. The College of Law generously sponsored my research.
1 Unless otherwise noted, I use the term "uniform" to refer either to uniform or
model laws. Where necessary, I differentiate between uniform and model acts. See
infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for an explanation of the difference between
these two approaches.
2 The body of law related to mediation includes more than 2000 state or federal
statutory provisions and innumerable court rules and agency regulations, as well as a
large body of case law. See NANCY H. ROGERs & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION:
LAW, PoLICY & PRACTICE § 13:01 (2d ed. 1994).
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encountered en route. The Article relates these broad considerations to the
current regulatory landscape of mediation law in an effort to provide
reference points for the uniform mediation project.
Part I presents an overview of the uniform law enterprise, focusing on
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and on
the Conference's distinction between uniform and model acts. Part II
considers possible reasons for adopting a uniform statutory approach. It
examines public-regarding purposes and also the self-interested vantage
point of various participants before discussing how these perspectives might
apply in the mediation context. Part II also identifies different approaches to
measuring and defining the success of a uniform law project, and suggests
that a broader understanding of what constitutes success may be helpful.
Finally, Part III raises several problems that are likely to confront any
effort to promulgate a uniform law and indicates how these problems may
arise in the mediation law setting.
I. THE CONFERENCE AND ITS PRODUCTS
The primary originator of uniform statutory efforts in this country is the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(Conference). Formed in 1892, the Conference's stated purpose is to
"promote uniformity in the law among the several states on subjects as to
which uniformity is desirable and practicable." 3 The Conference has a
close connection to the American Bar Association (ABA); it grew out of an
ABA decision in 1889 to work for uniformity of the laws through voluntary
state action. 4 The Conference's constitution requires its drafting committees
to consult with the ABA-the only public or private entity so favored5-
and to submit uniform acts to the ABA for its review. 6 The Conference has
3 HANDBOOK OF Tim NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-
EIGHTH YEAR 399 (1994) [hereinafter 1989 HANDBOOK].
4 See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
18 (1991). The Conference was founded at a meeting of representatives from seven
states held in conjunction with the 1892 ABA Annual Meeting. See id. at 11. TheABA
contributes financial support to the Conference on an annual basis. See Kathleen
Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some
Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 89 (1993).
5 See 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 413.
6 See id. at 401, 404.
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long maintained that its close relationship with the ABA and with state and
local bar associations offers otherwise unattainable access to and acceptance
from both state legislatures and the public at large. 7 In recent decades,
Conference products that have encountered disapproval or even substantial
opposition within the ABA House of Delegates have been starkly
unsuccessful in state legislatures. 8 While widespread ABA support is not
sufficient to ensure broad enactment by state legislatures, it may well be a
necessary precondition.
The Conference is composed of commissioners from all fifty states,
Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico. Each jurisdiction determines-usually
by statute-the method of appointment, number of commissioners, and
length of tenure. The norm is three or four commissioners per state,
appointed by the governor or the legislature on a nonpartisan basis for three
to five year terms. 9 Through regular reappointments, commissioners often
serve for extended periods of up to twenty years or more. 10 Commissioners
must be members of the bar; 11 they are typically practicing attorneys, law
professors, judges, and legislators. 12 The Conference receives most of its
7 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 85-86, 91.
8 See, e.g., id. at 104-105 (reporting that 1972 Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident
Reparations Act drafted by Conference and disapproved by ABA has never been
adopted in any state); id. at 111-112 (reporting on narrow ABA approval of Uniform
Land Transactions Act and Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, neither of
which has been enacted by a single state).
9 See, e.g., MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 26 (Law. Co-op. 1988) (authorizing the
governor to appoint "three suitable persons" for five year terms); Oio REv. CODE
ANN. § 105.21 (Anderson 1994) (authorizing the governor to appoint "four competent
persons" for three year terms). There are variations, especially with regard to the
number of commissioners; one-fourth of the states allow for appointment of seven or
more commissioners. See 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 12-29 (listing
commissioners for all 50 states plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico).
10 See 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 399 (describing how commissioners may
become life members after 20 years of service); id. at 12-29 (indicating that as of 1989,
60 commissioners had been elected to life member status and more than 40 others had
at least 15 years service).
11 See id. at 400.
12 See CONMEENCE FACT SHEET (1996). What I refer to as the Conference Fact
Sheet is a summary of the organization, its history, and its procedures, along with a
detailed chart recording passage of uniform and model acts as of September 30, 1996.
These materials typically are included as part of the annual Conference Handbook. See
1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 395-397, 558-563. However, the Conference has
not issued a Handbook since 1994, when its 1989 Handbook was published. In addition
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funds through state-by-state appropriations. In addition, major uniform law
projects may receive support from external sources such as foundations,
interest groups, and federal agencies. 13
The Conference operates primarily through standing and special
committees. Proposals for uniform acts, which may be generated by many
different sources, are referred to the Standing Committee on Scope and
Program (Scope and Program Committee). That committee investigates
each proposed act and then reports to the Executive Committee on whether
the subject is appropriate for Conference attention. If the Scope and
Program Committee recommends a proposal as desirable and feasible, and
the Executive Committee approves, then a special committee is appointed to
prepare drafts of an act. 14 Each draft act must be considered, section by
section, by the entire Conference at no less than two annual meetings. 15
After that consideration, the Conference. may decide by a vote of the states
whether to promulgate the draft as a uniform or model act. Each state is
entitled to one vote; a proposed act must be approved by a majority of the
to regular commissioners, the Conference provides that officials of a state legislative
service or drafting bureau may serve as associate commissioners, able to assist in
drafting and debating but not voting. See id. at 399. There are between 40 and 50 such
associate members at present. See id. at 12-29.
A separate private organization consisting of lawyers, judges, and academics is the
American Law Institute (ALl). Its focus is on drafting Restatements of the Law, which
are used primarily by courts rather than as templates for state legislatures. The ALI
does have an ongoing formal relationship with the Conference in that both organizations
provide representatives on a Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code-the UCC is widely recognized as the paragon uniform statutory effort. Apart
from that arrangement, the ALI is not directed toward codification the way the
Conference is. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Econony of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 600-601 (1995).
13 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 68, 101; Patchel, supra note 4, at 89.
14 See 15 U.L.A. iii (1997); 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 401-402. The
uniform mediation law project, which is closely coordinated with the ABA and its
Section on Dispute Resolution, is proceeding in conjunction with the Conference
process. The Scope and Program Committee effort has been undertaken, and the
Executive Committee is interested in the idea of a uniform or model act. It now appears
likely that there will be a joint drafting effort featuring interlocking drafting committees
from both the Conference and the ABA. See Letter from Gene N. Lebrun, Conference
President, to Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ABA Model
Mediation Project Co-Chairs (Nov. 10, 1997) (copy on file with author).
15 See 15 U.L.A. iii (1997); 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 404.
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states represented at an annual meeting and at least twenty jurisdictions. 16
In seeking to promote uniformity in state law, the Conference may
produce statutes designated as either uniform acts or model acts. The
special drafting committee, the Executive Committee, and the Conference
each has input into whether a draft statute is circulated, presented, and
approved as uniform or model. 17 The Conference's criteria for
distinguishing the two are not terribly detailed or precise. An act is to be
designated "uniform" if uniformity of its provisions among the various
jurisdictions is a principal objective and there is substantial reason to
anticipate enactment in a large number of jurisdictions. 18 Legislatures are
urged to adopt uniform acts exactly as written. An act is to be designated
"model" if uniformity of provisions is a desirable, though not a principal,
objective or if the act may substantially achieve its purposes even though a
number of jurisdictions do not adopt the statute in its entirety. 19 Model acts
serve more as guideline legislation, which states may borrow from or
modify to suit their individual needs and conditions. Model acts may be
more appropriate when the subject matter is of interstate interest but not
substantial interstate implication, and also when the statute provides an
approach for handling an emergent need in order to keep imminent state
legislation sensible and harmonious.20
When these alternatives are considered in the context of mediation, one
can make a plausible case for a model act approach. The current regulatory
setting includes rules promulgated at both the state and local levels,
16 See 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 405.
17 See id. at 441.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 441-442.
20 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 67-68 (quoting earlier Executive Committee
report). The Conference is not the only organization authorized or able to produce these
two types of laws. The ABA has produced model codes on its own without
contributions from the Conference. One notable example is the Model Procurement
Code for State and Local Governments, jointly completed in the 1970s by the ABA
Section of Public Contract Law and the Urban, State, and Local Government Section,
and adopted by some 15 states and many more municipalities. See F. Trowbridge Vom
Baur, A Personal History of the Model Procurement Code, 25 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 149,
150, 172 (1996). On occasion, the ABA and the Conference have actually competed in
the drafting process. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act is a
recent example. Both the Conference and the ABA Family Law Section produced their
own drafts; the ABA House of Delegates approved the Conference act in 1989. See
ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 123-124.
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governing disputes that may be court-annexed or private, and involving
subject matter that ranges from relatively narrow domestic relations
disputes or neighborhood disagreements to broader multiparty commercial
or environmental conflicts. Moreover, the torrent of existing mediation
statutes embraces disparate patterns of coverage with respect to subjects
important enough to deserve regulatory consideration. For certain issues
there is a single, dominant statutory position;21 other subjects have
generated two contrasting approaches. 22 A third category of problems has
spawned a variety of statutory responses; 23 there are even some matters
characterized by the unexpected absence of any statutory treatment.2 4 It is
21 One example is laws that authorize courts to mandate mediation in domestic
relations cases involving contested custody or visitation issues. These statutes typically
exclude situations in which there is domestic violence. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-6-
20(e) (Supp. 1997); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170(b) (West Supp. 1998); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.11(5), (6), (8) (West Supp. 1997).22 States are divided, for example, on whether mediation of domestic relations
cases should be mandatory. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170(a) (West Supp. 1998)
(authorizing local courts to compel domestic relations parties into mediation), and ME.
Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(2) (West Supp. 1997) (same), and DEL. FAM. CT.
R. Civ. P. 16(a), (b) (same), with 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3901 (West Supp.
1997) (authorizing courts to arrange for mediation of domestic relations issues only
with consent of the parties), and VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.35(6) (Michie 1996)
(same), and MICH. R. CT. 2.403(A)(1), 3.216(B)(2), (3) (prohibiting or limiting
mediation of disputes that involve custody or visitation rights). As noted above, states
mandating mediation of domestic relations disputes usually exclude cases marked by
violence. See supra note 21.
23 Mediation privileges create a right to block compelled disclosure in discovery
and other proceedings whether or not the proceedings are governed by rules of
evidence. Statutory provisions creating these privileges differ in terms of the scope of
information they protect, the source of the information protected, whether they are
absolute or qualified, whether they apply only in civil proceedings, who may assert or
waive the privilege, and how "mediation" is defined for purposes of applying the
privilege. See RoGERs & McEwEN, supra note 2, §§ 9:10-9:17 (discussing multiple
statutory approaches).
24 Laws mandating mediation often permit judges discretion not to order the
parties to participate in mediation, but in doing so they give little or no guidance as to
the exercise of or limits on this discretion. See, e.g., ME. R. REFERRAL ALT. Disp.
RESOL. SERV. 1 (mandating mediation of small claims matters and certain domestic
relations matters, "unless the judge ... having jurisdiction over a particular matter
grants a waiver"); MICH. R. CT. 2.403(A)(2) (mandating mediation of tort cases,
subject to judicial discretion if the court "finds that mediation of that action would be
inappropriate").
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not surprising that in light of the wide range of substantive settings and the
diverse patterns of existing regulatory response, states differ as to the
subject matter areas and the procedural issues that they view as requiring
statutory attention. For this reason, it may be impractical to impose the
more rigid mold of a uniform law.25
On the other hand, there are risks involved in promulgating a model act
rather than a uniform statute. It may be that jurisdictions will adopt certain
provisions yet fail to discard their pre-existing requirements. For example,
by adopting new fairness-based procedural norms while retaining their
existing structure of rules, states could tilt the balance away from simplicity
or efficiency and end up discouraging the use of mediation in a number of
settings.26 Further, a model act that blesses diversity may encourage more
public or private entities to maintain the status quo by seeking wholesale
exemptions from coverage under the new law.27 Existing mediation
provisions often are embedded in substantive law titles or chapters of state
codes.28 This history, combined with a less homogeneous model statute
approach, could effectively encourage spouses, landlords, neighbors, and
employees to think of themselves as having a predictable interest group
orientation. Uniformity, by contrast, leaves these participants in the role of
"parties to mediation" who could on different occasions occupy any of the
four above-mentioned roles. As a result, they presumably would have less
reason to pursue an exemption from the new legal regime.
As of September 30, 1996, there were ninety-six uniform acts and
25 Cf. Vom Baur, supra note 20, at 161-162 (recounting how range of state and
local procurement processes led drafters to opt for model code approach).
26 Cf. Constance Cushman, The ABA Model Procurement Code: Implementation,
Evolution, and Crisis of Survival, 25 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 173, 189 (1996) (criticizing
practice of grafting selected model code provisions onto an already process-burdened
bureaucracy).
27 Cf. Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
on California's New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TuLsA L.J. 297, 304-307 (1996)
(describing how certain entities successfully secured their own exclusion from coverage
under new state statute patterned after a model act).
28 See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1382 (West 1996) (compelling mediator to
disclose amount of wrongful discharge backpay award in certain circumstances); IowA
CODE ANN. § 216.15B (West Supp. 1997) (establishing mediation confidentiality
requirements and exemptions with respect to discrimination complaints brought before
Civil Rights Commission); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522(a) (1993) (requiring mediators
and other professionals to report suspected child abuse or neglect to state department of
social services).
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twenty-nine model acts on the Conference's list of current approvals. 29 In
addition, over 140 previously approved acts have been withdrawn as either
obsolete or superseded. 30 These uniform and model acts have been
categorized in various ways, based on either subject matter or function. 31
First are statutes aimed at encouraging reciprocal interstate cooperation.
Such laws prompt a state to act reciprocally with respect to rights and
remedies-for example, to protect parents residing in other states who are
owed child support and thereby avoid the injuries to their own residents that
would follow if other states were provoked into more hostile action.32
These statutes often involve child-parent relations. The Uniform Acts on
Adoption, Child Custody Jurisdiction, and Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support are notable examples. Second are acts that seek to avoid conflicts
of law stemming from the fact that an event may be affected by several
different states' rules. These conflicts frequently arise in relation to
determining the applicable law at death so as to facilitate the processing and
distribution of decedents' estates. Examples include the Uniform
Anatomical Gifts Act, the Uniform Act on Testamentary Additions to
Trusts, and various aspects of the Uniform Probate Code. Third are statutes
developed to promote the efficient flow of commerce between states.
Obviously, these acts address commercial and business subjects; the
Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Partnership Act, and Model
Employment Termination Act are notable examples. Fourth are statutes
without major interstate consequences that are intended to respond to
emergent needs or clarify archaic usages. They often involve establishing
predictable or fixed rules of procedure that affect the operation of courts.
Examples include the Uniform Acts on Attendance of Out of State
Witnesses, Federal Lien Registration, and Declaratory Judgments. The four
categories are not mutually exclusive-for instance, the Uniform
29 See CONFERENCE FACT SHEET, supra note 12.
30 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 130; 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 466-
472 (listing acts that have been withdrawn).
31 For efforts to classify Conference statutory products by subject matter, see
James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2096, 2104 (1991). See also
Kim Quaile Hill & Patricia A. Hurley, Uniform State Law Adoptions in the American
States: An Explanatory Analysis, 18 P-BLius 117, 120-121 (1988) (listing popular and
unpopular uniform laws in subject matter setting). For efforts to classify Conference
acts based on their principal purpose, see 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 440; Larry
E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 149-150 (1996).
32 See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 31, at 150.
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Arbitration Act could be deemed an effort to promote economic efficiency
or a response to emergent procedural needs33-but each of the four may be
said to encompass a large number of uniform or model statutory efforts.
As soft as these categories are, a uniform or model mediation act
accentuates the degree of overlap among them. A mediation statute would
address emergent procedural needs by offering predictable rules on matters
that tend to involve lawyers and courts.34 Yet an important dimension of
such an act would be to avoid conflicts of law and promote reciprocal
cooperation among states. Particularly with regard to issues that permit or
require judicial enforcement, differing approaches could trigger interstate
hostilities in the absence of such a uniform or model act. Two clear
examples are the enforceability of agreements to mediate and the
admissibility in court of statements made during a mediation session. In the
former instance, one party may seek to compel mediation pursuant to the
law of state X while the other party resists based on the law of state Y. In
the latter setting, evidence from a mediation in state X may be offered as
admissible in a state Y court proceeding even though it would not have
been admissible in state X. In addition to its procedural character and its
promotion of interstate cooperation, a uniform or model act also could
enhance economic efficiency across state lines by facilitating quicker, less
costly resolution of commercial and employment-related disputes.
Apart from furthering several different objectives, a uniform or model
mediation act also implicates a range of subject matter areas. The proposed
statute would have no special focus on commercial settings, children and
families, or probate issues, but it should have an important effect on
disputes in each of these substantive domains and others as well. Some
commentators and interested groups contend that mediation is biased against
particular interests because it sharpens, or does not sufficiently alleviate,
the pre-existing imbalance of power and resources between disputants. 35
33 See White, supra note 31, at 2104.
34 Even this description is incomplete. A substantial amount of mediation is
conducted away from the courts by nonlawyers in neighborhood or community settings.
See generally JENNIFER E. BEER, PEACEMAING IN YouR NEiGHBORHOOD (1986);
COMMUNrTY MEDIATON: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITONERS AND RESEARCERS (Karen
Grover Duffy et al. eds., 1991).
35 See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441, 523 (1992) (contending that divorce
mediation reinforces disparities in power between men and women and undermines
recent divorce law reforms that had enhanced women's economic rights); Trina Grillo,
The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-
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Even if these contentions prove unfounded, 36 or can be addressed by a
well-crafted statute, there is still a considerable perception that mediation
affects the bottom line when resolving subject matter disputes. In sum, a
uniform or model mediation act serves major interstate cooperation
objectives as well as meeting traditional procedural needs, and it implicates
substantive policy matters to a greater degree than many other types of
procedural statutes.
1550, 1607 (1991) (contending that mandatory divorce mediation is disempowering and
often actively harmful to women); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79
MINN. L. REv. 1317, 1319 n.2 (1995) (citing numerous critiques of divorce mediation
as placing women at a disadvantage); Carol A. Wittenburg et al., Employment
Disputes, in MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND
MEDIATORS 441, 449-451 (Dwight Golann ed., 1996) (contending that disparity in
resources and power between employers and employees presents distinct challenge for
mediation); Lamont E. Stallworth, Government Regulation of Workplace Disputes and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, in GOvERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP 369, 384 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) (contending that unrepresented
claimants are especially vulnerable to unfair treatment in mediation of workplace
disputes). See generally Richard Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books
About the Deformalization Movement, 13 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 145, 152-154 (1988)
(contending that ADR's unstructured setting and lack of formal rules increase likelihood
that outcomes will be affected by racial or other prejudice "with the result that the
haves once again come out ahead").
3 6 See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE
CHILD: SoCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 151 (1992) (reporting that women
do not fare worse in divorce mediation outcomes than in normal negotiation of divorce
disputes); Peter A. Dillon & Robert E. Emery, Divorce Mediation and Resolution of
Child Custody Disputes: Long-Term Effects, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHOL. 131, 138-139
(1996) (discussing nine year follow-up study that compared families assigned to custody
mediation with families pursuing regular litigation and found that noncustodial parents
assigned to mediation reported more frequent current contact with their children and
that parents in the mediation group reported communicating more frequently about their
children); Donald E. Stull & Nancy M. Kaplan, The Positive Impact of Divorce
Mediation on Children's Behavior, MEDIATION Q., Winter 1987, at 57-58 (reporting
that children of parents who experienced mediation performed better in school and were
less likely to engage in delinquent behavior than children whose parents experienced
adjudicative resolution).
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II. RATIONALES FOR UNIFORMITY AND DEFINITIONS OF SUCCESS
A. A Private Legislative Process
It is useful to think of the Conference as a private legislative operation,
analogous to the public legislative operation in Congress or a state
legislature. Like Congress, the statutes produced can be viewed as
furthering certain public goals or broad societal interests. Alternatively, the
Conference legislative process can be characterized more skeptically as
self-interested, with narrowly focused goals.
Several distinct but overlapping public rationales support the uniform
law movement.37 One is a desire to enhance commercial and business
development in what has become an interstate or national economic system.
This could mean contributing to more efficient interstate transactions or
establishing minimum business standards that prevent a race to the bottom
among state legislatures. A recent example is the Model Employment
Termination Act, which proposed simplified, less costly procedures for
resolving claims of arbitrary or unjust discharge in the workplace. 38 In
addition to promoting consistency in employment relations among multistate
firms, such an act encourages a reliable judicial approach to the
interpretation of key terms such as "good cause" or "business judgment."
A second public purpose is the reaffirmation and promotion of states'
rights. When states frame uniform solutions for matters affecting their
common interests, they are strengthening state sovereignty and removing
any excuse for the federal government to absorb new powers. Moreover, a
uniform state law approach may offer more stability than a federal
regulatory solution. Federal agencies can revisit or change their rules after
notice and minimal discussion, whereas a widely adopted uniform law can
only be modified by the acts of many state legislatures.
A third public rationale might be called good government or best
practices responsiveness. When substantial social, economic, or legal
problems arise, a timely and progressive legislative response is what one
hopes for from government. Individual states may generate such responses
on their own, but the uniform law approach offers special advantages.
37 See Hill & Hurley, supra note 31, at 118-119; White, supra note 31, at 2098-
2103.
38 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, 7A U.L.A. 80-99 (Supp. 1991);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69
WASH. L. REv. 361, 370 (1994).
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These include a more detached and nonpartisan drafting process, a regular
willingness to rely on experts, and greater patience in setting the legislative
calendar. That the problem is complex or evokes strong views only
strengthens the case for a thoughtful approach to keep emergent state laws
pointed in a single, sensible direction.
Although they are technically public officials appointed by the
governor, commissioners are often referred to as part of a private
legislature because they differ from federal and state representatives in two
critical respects. They are not democratically elected, and they are not
politically accountable. 39 This arrangement does tend to promote a more
competent and sophisticated legislative product. Commissioners take an
intellectual interest in uniform law that a typical state senator or
assemblyman would not. Commissioners also are nonpartisan, they do not
have to answer to the people, and the method of their low key
reappointment enables them to focus on long-range issues that elected
legislators often must ignore if not disdain. Still, notwithstanding or
perhaps because of this insulation from the public political arena, a number
of commentators have identified pressures within the Conference's private
legislative process that may derail or even undermine the commitment to
broad public or good government objectives.40
One risk is the extraordinary influence of interest groups, especially
those that are well organized and amply financed. Interest groups of course
influence public legislatures through political lobbying techniques, but they
do not officially participate in the process of creating public laws. By
contrast, interest groups can and do officially participate in the creation of
uniform laws. The Conference understandably wants expertise, input, and
support from these organized interests, and group members through their
lawyers may serve on Conference committees that investigate, draft, or
review proposed legislative solutions. The Conference will listen to
representatives from all sides, but the depth and continuity of a group's
participation often reflects relative resources. Thus, for example, segments
of the banking industry may contribute sufficient business to a few large
law firms so that those firms will incur the costs of participating in drafting
committee meetings and monitoring developments over a multi-year
gestation period for Article 4 of the UCC. Bank customers and their
39 See Patchel, supra note 4, at 91; White, supra note 31, at 2096.
40 Several recent articles have applied public choice-related critiques to the
uniform lawmaking process. See generally Patchel, supra note 4; Ribstein &
Kobayashi, supra note 31; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12.
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consumer group representatives are not likely to have as much influence on
the drafting process over time.41 In addition, well organized interest groups
may be able to block widespread adoption of Conference-approved acts
based on their power to delay or defeat proposed bills within particular state
legislatures. Because this power to obstruct in a few states threatens the
overarching goal of uniformity, the Conference may feel compelled to give
these groups veto-type control over particular issues or legislative
provisions. 42
The economic critique of uniform lawmaking identifies risks
attributable to other participants in the private legislative process. Lawyers
play a major role both as advisors and commissioners. They have at least
some professional self-interest in maintaining a need for their services.
Legal rules that rely on complex or vague terms may require more lawyer
assistance in order to determine what rights or responsibilities apply in
particular situations. This may result in continuing if subtle pressures
favoring litigation, or it may simply increase the need for legal planning
and advice. 43
Reformer types, notably law professors, also play a substantial role in
the private legislative process; they too may not be immune from the allure
of self-interest. Legal academics can write about and teach uniform law
proposals even if the proposals are enacted by only one or two state
legislatures. They may also enhance their academic reputations by
contributing to a Conference-approved product-they get satisfaction and
status from being part of a law reform movement. This is not to suggest
that law professors are so starry eyed they will work for proposals that are
utterly hopeless. But legal academics in general may well have less concern
than interest groups do with the transition from Conference approval to
broad enactment by state legislatures. 44 Further, legal academics in the
mediation area may derive particular benefits from a uniform law effort.
When mediation is deemed worthy of Conference legislative attention, this
contributes to its validation as a new professional approach. Mediation
41 See Patchel, supra note 4, at 98-105; Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 31, at
142-143; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 610.
42 See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 31, at 143.
43 See id. at 144.
44 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 610-611; see also Daniel A. Farber,
The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 917 (1980) (arguing that legal
academics are predisposed to value scholarship that is novel, unconventional, or
paradigm-shifting, and to view merely thoughtful work as pedestrian).
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teachers and scholars should then have an easier time recruiting graduates
to enter the field and persuading skeptical faculty colleagues as to its
legitimacy. 45
One need not buy into the whole public choice-related vision to
recognize that some of these factors are likely to affect the private
legislative process. Although participation in law reform organizations like
the Commission implies at least some appetite for changing the current state
of the law, there are countervailing pressures as well. The shared interest in
a widely approved uniform or model law can push the process toward less
significant change from the status quo and also toward generally worded
legislative rules or standards. At the same time, factors of self-interest may
play a more pronounced role with respect to proposed substantive statutes
than procedural ones. Where a uniform or model act addresses allocation of
certain economic benefits, such as banking or employment termination
standards, or protection of identified status positions, such as those of
children or decedent estates, organized interest groups can anticipate
outcomes and invest in the process to help shape the outcomes they desire.
By contrast, procedural objectives that are framed in more neutral terms
and are less systematically related to predictable substantive goals may not
be as susceptible to this kind of pressure.46
A uniform or model mediation act should be viewed as furthering some
if not all of the public-regarding rationales previously identified. Most
prominent, perhaps, is the good government rationale. With hundreds of
conflicting or overlapping public and private approaches now in play, the
uniform mediation project can encourage rationality if not consistency by
promulgating best practices on issues such as mediator training,
45 The final participants in this private legislative process are the commissioners
themselves. Although extended tenure and the absence of compensation (beyond
expenses) liberate them from more traditional political constraints, they too have private
interests that may affect the content of uniform laws. There are reputational benefits
gained from participation and expertise. Commissioners who are lawyers may enhance
their legal practices as counselors or expert witnesses based on their familiarity with a
particular uniform law product or process. There are also the modest rewards of
expense-paid trips to locations where acts are drafted. And there may be benefits to the
business interests of clients who are affected by the new uniform act. See Ribstein &
Kobayashi, supra note 31, at 144-145; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 610-611.
46 See generally Arthur Earl Bonfield, Administrative Procedure Acts in an Age of
Comparative Scarcity, 75 IowA L. Rnv. 845, 847 (1990) (distinguishing between
substantive and process objectives in context of agency procedures required by
administrative procedure acts).
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confidentiality, and enforcement of agreements to mediate. Cooperation
between states in the administration of justice will also be served if
mediation of family disputes or inheritance-related disagreements must
satisfy certain best principles. In addition, a set of guidelines for mediating
private commercial or employment disputes may promote business
efficiency and facilitate economic growth.
Yet a mediation statute also faces some of the risks identified by
scholarly critics of uniform lawmaking. There is the risk that certain
standards-for instance, directing the mediator to act "in the best interests
of the child" or "consistent with the law"-will be too vague to be readily
or consistently applied, or else will require searching judicial review. There
is the prospect that certain groups will secure special favors in the private
legislative process, such as exclusions from coverage so that they can
continue to mediate or litigate under the rules and standards with which
they are familiar. If mediation supporters are the primary drafters, they
may be willing to countenance such exclusions in their effort to maximize
the act's acceptability by avoiding major controversy. More generally,
there is the possibility that pressures from interest groups and
commissioners for a law that is adoptable by the Conference and enactable
by most states will result in something less, even much less, than a best
practices approach. To be sure, compromise and accommodation are
regular features of any legislative process given proponents' ultimate goal
of producing a law. The pressure to accommodate various interested parties
may, however, become especially intense when drafters and supporters face
the prospect of a multi-year internal review process followed by the
challenge of earning approval from fifty different legislatures.
B. Variations on the Theme of Success
Of the ninety-six uniform acts on its current list, the Conference reports
that forty-seven have been enacted by twenty or more states and that
twenty-four have been enacted by forty or more states.47 The twenty-four
that have achieved something close to uniform adoption48 include seven
UCC provisions; the other seventeen are a mix of procedural, family,
47 See CONFmENCE FACT SHEET, supra note 12 (recording passage of uniform and
model acts as of Sept. 30, 1996).
48 1 refer to enactment by 40 of 52 jurisdictions (50 states plus Washington, D.C.
and Puerto Rico)-a better than three-fourths enactment rate (77%)-as close to
uniform adoption.
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probate, and business or commercial laws.49 The more widely enacted
uniform laws reached their level of success through two basic patterns of
enactment history. The first is a "sudden burst" pattern. A few states adopt
in initial years, then there is a flurry of enactment activity, followed by a
return to the more sedate pace. The other is a "slow and steady" pattern.
Two or three states adopt every other year or so, but there is never a
sudden surge of state enactments. 50 The various categories of uniform laws
identified earlier51 do not appear to fall into one specific pattern of
enactment history, and there is no sound basis for predicting whether either
pattern would apply to a mediation act.
The attempt to measure a uniform or model act's success in terms of
how many states have adopted it gives rise to various areas of concern. One
is the difficulty of determining whether a jurisdiction has enacted enough
major and minor provisions of an act's approved text to be deemed a
substantial adoption. 52 The Model State Administrative Procedure Act,
approved by the Conference in 1981, provides an appropriate recent
example. An administrative law expert writing in 1992 reported substantial
or significant adoption by six states. 53 Today, the Uniform Laws Annotated
reports substantial adoption by three of the six states, 54 and the Conference
itself reports adoption by only one of those three states. 55
A second concern involves the low and diminishing proportion of
Conference products that actually garner widespread acceptance. Only one
in four currently approved uniform acts has been adopted in forty or more
jurisdictions. Further, rates of adoption have declined in recent years. Of
the sixty-four uniform acts approved since 1980, fewer than half have been
enacted in twenty jurisdictions, only twelve have been adopted in forty or
49 See CONFERENCE FACT SHEET, supra note 12; see also Hill & Hurley, supra
note 31, at 120 (listing 13 most widely adopted uniform law proposals as of 1985).
50 The Appendix contains graphs illustrating enactment histories for three "sudden
burst" uniform acts (Child Custody, Controlled Substances, and UCC) and also three
"slow and steady" uniform acts (Arbitration, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, and
Partnership).
51 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
52 See 15 U.L.A. iv (1997).
53 See Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act:
Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1079-1080 (1992).
5 4 See PREFATORY NOTE TO MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT, 15 U.L.A. 1
(1997) [hereinafter PREFATORY NOTE].
55 See CONFERENCE FACT SHEET, supra note 12.
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more jurisdictions, and six of those twelve involve revisions of various
articles of the UCC. 56 Adoption rates for model acts are much lower: only
two of the twenty-nine model acts on the Conference's current list have
been enacted by more than eight states.57 The figure may be slightly
misleading-at least one model act that was widely enacted has been
superseded by a version less favorably received. 58 Still, of the thirteen
model acts promulgated since 1980, the Conference reports that eleven
have been enacted by two states, one state, or no states at all. 59 Even
accounting for the long enactment process, the rate of approval for both
uniform and model acts appears to be on a downward slope. There is some
feeling, expressed by a former Conference president, that lawyers and
legislators may be reacting against a barrage of uniform statutes that they
find unnecessary or impracticable. 60 Of course the probability of securing
widespread adoption is difficult to gauge at the outset of the planning and
drafting process. One consequence of such uncertainty is that there may be
little deterrent value to claims that a particular proposal is unlikely to be
enacted by many jurisdictions. 61
The nature of the acts adopted by a supermajority of jurisdictions
cannot readily be classified by subject matter. Both the ten to fifteen acts
most widely adopted and the dozen or so adopted by no states at all involve
a mix of family, probate, commercial, and court-centered statutes. 62 There
is a variation among states, ranging from fifty-nine enactments by Colorado
and Montana to thirty-three by Alabama, thirty-one by Georgia, and
twenty-two by Louisiana. 63 In general, the high-end states are from the
midwest, west, and northwest, while most low-end states are located in the
56 See id.
57 The Model Consumer Credit Code and the Model Mandatory Disposition of
Detainers Act have each been adopted by 11 jurisdictions. See id.
58 See PREFATORY NOTE, supra note 54, at 1 (reporting that more than half of the
states have enacted an administrative procedure act based wholly or partially on the
model acts of 1946 or 1961).
59 See CONFERENCE FACT SHEET, supra note 12.
60 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 113 (quoting former Conference president
George C. Keely).
61 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 608-609.
62 See CONFERENCE FAcT SHEET, supra note 12; Hill & Hurley, supra note 31, at
120-121.
63 See CONFERENCE FAcT SHEET, supra note 12.
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south and southeast.64 One study has suggested that states with a robust
good government tradition have been more frequent participants while those
with a strong states' rights philosophy have been least responsive to the
uniform law movement. 65 Low levels of state enactment for particular
uniform acts are doubtless attributable in part to extrinsic factors such as
the tenor of the times. Some acts may reflect Conference agreement on
issues or objectives too innovative or unknown to achieve broad popularity.
Others may come too late- the identified problem either has been addressed
already in disparate yet tolerable fashion by the states or perhaps has been
widely accepted'as a problem that can remain unaddressed in the regulatory
arena.
Given that "enactability" is at times difficult to measure and in general
difficult to achieve in widespread terms, it is important to consider
additional or even alternative ways of identifying success for uniform or
model acts. These laws may promote uniformity indirectly; as when states
borrow certain provisions to address part of the identified need, or they
adopt in principle the act's basic approach, or even when states are
prompted to avoid unwise legislative policies they might otherwise have
pursued. 66 A model or uniform act may also lead to legislative adoption by
local jurisdictions; on some issues this may be as meaningful or effective as
statewide enactment.67 Further, model or uniform acts may shape the
development of state law because they influence how judges approach
certain kinds of cases, or because law professors' promotion of the
legislative approach in their scholarship and teaching is absorbed by a new
generation of practitioners. 68 The Conference itself has recognized that
there are indicia of influence besides widespread enactment, and it has
64 See Hill & Hurley, supra note 31, at 122.
65 See id. at 121-122. There is some tension between this suggestion and the
earlier-noted contention that promotion of states' rights is an important public rationale
for the uniform law movement. Of course, strong advocates of state sovereignty may
prefer their own state's laws even over uniform laws. See generally Deborah J. Merritt,
Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 545-552 (1995) (arguing that a
principal value of federalism is empowerment of state governments which then
enhances their separate abilities to temper the direction of federal law, respond to the
needs of local citizens, and adopt novel programs).
66 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 109-110.
67 See, e.g., Vom Baur, supra note 20, at 172 (discussing local jurisdictions'
adoption of model government procurement code).
68 See Patchel, supra note 4, at 159-160 (arguing that importance of enactment
should be placed in perspective).
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encouraged discussion though not pursuit of additional avenues to
success.
69
These alternative ways to measure influence or accomplishment should
be pursued in connection with the uniform mediation law project. Extensive
adoption of particular mediation provisions or certain broad principles
comports with the reality of diverse approaches to mediation undertaken
through local legislation and court rules as well as statewide statutes.
Deterrence of unwise or excessive regulatory intervention is one
appropriate response to the expressed concern that mediation may become
unduly rigid or bureaucratized. 70 Moreover, the dynamic growth of
mediation and its numerous areas of current controversy may mean that a
proposed statute's influence on judges and law professors offers a special
opportunity to develop evolving standards of best practice. With regard to
each of these alternative forms of success, a model act approach is likely to
offer enhanced flexibility even though it also produces less satisfying results
on the traditional enactability scoreboard.
IH. PITFALLS ALONG THE WAY
The literature on uniform and model laws does not include a manual for
how to draft and secure widespread enactment of the perfect statute.
Moreover, in seeking to derive from other uniform law experiences lessons
that might apply to a uniform mediation project, one must be mindful of
subject matter specifics that distinguish those experiences from the practical
realities of mediation. Nonetheless, there are certain key issues that tend to
arise in many uniform statutory efforts. By focusing on several issues of
structure and process, I hope to suggest possible directions in which the
mediation law project might proceed.
One structural issue involves tensions between uniformity and diversity.
In conceptualizing a statutory plan for mediation, there are plainly
advantages to pursuing a more fixed approach. Uniformity is likely to result
69 See 1989 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 440 (suggesting that Conference acts may
promote uniformity indirectly through adoptions in principle, adoptions of particular
sections or parts, and impact on case law and teaching practices).
70 See, e.g., Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 903, 908-909, 914-915 (1997) (discussing dangers associated
with institutionalization); Panel Discussion, What Happens When Mediation is
Institutionalized?: To the Parties, Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 307, 309-311 (1994) (comments of Professor Baruch Bush) (same).
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in simplification of the role of government. Whether it is courts
encouraging or directing certain mediation procedures or agencies
monitoring performance by private parties, consistent predictable rules and
standards should facilitate government efforts. Reduced complexity also
should enable individuals to have easier and better informed access to
mediation, presumably an important objective of the project. Uniformity
would save money as well-for governments by avoiding duplication of
effort in various problem-solving contexts and for individuals who will find
it less costily to participate on their own or with representation from
nonlawyers.71 In addition, a uniform approach to mediation would
minimize the substantively based advocacy that might otherwise be
expected-for instance, from landlords and tenants or employers and
employees-and that could undermine a broader best practices strategy.
A more uniform statutory plan for mediation may bring disadvantages
as well as potential benefits. There is considerable diversity in the way that
parties to mediation come together and interact. They may be court-directed
or privately initiated. Mediation may be part of an isolated transaction or a
long-term relationship. The parties may be relatively equal in their
bargaining sophistication- both one-shot or both repeat players-and in
their economic resources, or they may be starkly unequal in these respects.
The parties may also be difficult to identify in certain types of public
disputes, such as potential tenants or neighbors in a dispute over the
location of low income housing, or future victims of environmentally
harmful spillage. 72 While a uniform statute might be expansive and detailed
enough to address these and other variations, the "one size fits all"
approach may result in overproceduralization for some kinds of disputes
and underproceduralization for others. 73 Too much reliance on uniformity
also may frustrate the potential for state-by-state innovation and
experimentation, as well as blocking more decentralized lawmaking efforts
responsive to local conditions or priorities within each state. 74
A possible response to the tension just described is a statute that offers
71 See Asimow, supra note 53, at 1077; Bonfield, supra note 46, at 849; Ribstein
& Kobayashi, supra note 31, at 138.
72 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DisPuTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PRocEssEs 335 (2d ed. 1992).
73 Cf. Bonfield, supra note 46, at 849-850 (identifying similar concerns with
respect to a single, comprehensive administrative procedure act and its effects on the
diverse missions and circumstances of various government agencies).
74 See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 31, at 140-141.
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elements of both uniformity and diversity. One might imagine a certain
baseline structure of mandatory fair procedures or minimum standards,
with additional options or prescriptions presented in more flexible terms.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) has been touted
by its supporters as an apt example of this type of multi-tiered approach. 75
Unlike the federal Administrative Procedure Act, which prescribes
procedures only for formal adjudications, 76 the MSAPA covers all types of
agency orders. 77 The MSAPA includes certain fundamental due process
protections that are extended to all agency adjudication; two examples are
broad prohibitions on ex parte contacts and a mandated separation of
adjudicatory functions from adversarial ones, such as prosecution,
investigation, and advocacy. 78 At the same time, the MSAPA includes
numerous flexibility-enhancing provisions that allow agencies to make
adjudication less formal, costly, and adversarial. These include options for
conference, summary, and emergency hearing models that dispense with
various elements of the trial-type approach. 79
One could envision an analogous multi-tiered structure for a model or
uniform mediation statute. Provisions establishing confidentiality for
mediation may be the strongest contender for a uniform statutory response.
A broad respect for confidentiality is essential in order to encourage the use
of mediation, and in particular to avoid a chilling effect on parties and
mediators if communications thought to be privileged are subject to
subpoena at a later time or in another jurisdiction. 80 On the other hand, the
justice system's need for information may warrant exceptions allowing for
or compelling the production of evidence in certain clearly identified
circumstances.81 With respect to the law's treatment of confidentiality, the
75 See Asimow, supra note 53, at 1090-1105.
76 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994) (prescribing procedures for adjudications
"required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing").
77 See MODEL STATE ADMN. PROCEDURE AcT §§ 1-102(5), 4-101(a), 15 U.L.A.
11, 67 (1981); Asimow, supra note 27, at 308.
78 See MODEL STATE ADMiN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 4-213, 4-214, 15 U.L.A. 88,
89-90 (1981); Asimow, supra note 27, at 312-316.
79 See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 4-401 to 4-403, 4-501 to 4-
506, 15 U.L.A. 100-110 (1981); Asimow, supra note 53, at 1096-1104.
80 See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 2, § 9:02; Note, Protecting Confidentiality
in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 443-446 (1984).
81 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-36 (1993) (permitting mediator to testify
when allegations of crime are involved); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (1996)
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absence of uniformity at least on some issues may undermine the interstate
application of mediation agreements and perhaps weaken the fundamental
policy favoring mediation as an alternative to lawsuits.82
Other subjects seem more suited to a flexible approach. Provisions
addressing mediator qualifications illustrate the need to preserve diversity in
a legislative setting. A reasonable argument can be made that mediators
operating in court-annexed programs or in the shadow of the legal regime
will be more competent and instill more confidence in judges, parties, and
the public if they have law degrees.8 3 That argument may give insufficient
weight to other forms of professional education and may even fail to
recognize how legal training can adversely affect the skills that a mediator
brings to the table.84 Yet assuming arguendo that a law degree is a
worthwhile qualification for at least some court-annexed mediation
programs, it may well become a barrier to entry for neighborhood and
(allowing use of evidence presented in course of mediation when it relates to a crime);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (requiring mediators to report
instances of child abuse to local or state authorities); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(c)
(Michie 1997) (allowing mediators to report instances of child abuse). See generally
ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 2, §§ 9:12, 9:30.
82 Additional mediation issues might also warrant comprehensive treatment in core
statutory language. The enforceability of pre-dispute mediation clauses and the
establishment of certain prohibited conduct by mediators are subjects that might best be
addressed through uniformly applicable provisions. See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra
note 2, § 8:02 (discussing enforcement of mediation clauses and possible defenses to
enforceability); id. § 11:03 (discussing mediator liability to the parties for
malfeasance); Steven G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the
Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REv.
885, 941-944 (1997) (contending that more certainty regarding potential civil liability
of mediators is desirable while identifying problems in current approaches based on
tort, contract, and fiduciary duty); Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice:
A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmCS 503, 504, 535 (1991)
(arguing for clarification of ethical restrictions governing lawyers who serve as
mediators).
83 See, e.g., Sharon Press, Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation
Program: A View from the Field, 81 Ky. L.J. 1029, 1036-1038 (1993); Donald T.
Weckstein, Mediator Certification: Why and How, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 757, 767-768
(1996).
84 See George Nicolau, Ill-Considered Criteria Endanger Mediation, SPIDR
President Warns, 2 ALTERNATIvE Disp. RESOL. REP. 244, 245 (1988) (warning that
litigation or judicial background is at best irrelevant to performing the facilitative,
nonevaluative role of mediator); Weckstein, supra note 83, at 767 (noting risk that
existing professions could monopolize the practice).
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community-based mediators.8 5  Moreover, other advanced degree
requirements for mediators may be viewed as hindering innovation in what
is a problem-solving profession, and as frustrating efforts at decentralizing
the power to resolve disputes. 86 Accordingly, the issue of mediator
qualifications may call for a varied approach based on the type of mediation
setting and also on the differing values that mediators and parties ascribe to
professional education, apprenticeship, and certified training.87
A second structural issue worth identifying involves the possibility that
certain types of mediation or subject matter areas should be wholly or
partially exempted from a uniform or model act. It is likely that at the state
legislative level if not sooner, interested groups or entities will try to make
85 See Bullock & Gallagher, supra note 82, at 928-930; Press, supra note 83, at
1039-1040; Paul J. Spiegelman, Certifying Mediators: Using Selection Criteria to
Include the Qualified-Lessons from the San Diego Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. Rv.
677, 687-689 (1996).
86 See Sally E. Merry, Defining "Success" in the Neighborhood Justice Movement,
in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: AssEssM:Err OF AN EMERGING IDEA 172, 181 (Roman
Tomasic & Malcolm Feeley eds., 1982); Press, supra note 83, at 1040; Spiegelman,
supra note 85, at 688.
87 One could, for instance, require training in child development for custody and
visitation mediation or training in skills for dealing with juveniles in truancy mediation;
such training, however, would not be needed for mediators confronting corporate or
environmental disputes. See generally Bobby Marzine Harges, Mediator Qualifications:
The Trend Toward Professionalization, 1997 BYU L. REv. 687, 693-700 (analyzing
current education and training requirements for 28 states that regulate qualifications for
child custody and visitation mediators).
Apart from mediator qualification standards, one might envision variations in
providing for informal and formal discovery as part of mediation and also for specific
levels of judicial involvement in reviewing or approving mediated solutions. See
generally ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 2, §§ 4:06, 6:05 (discussing tradeoffs
between prediscovery and postdiscovery mediation, and advantages of case-by-case
approach to integrating mediation with discovery); id. §§ 2:02 n.13 and accompanying
text, 7:05 nn.13, 14, 27 and accompanying text (identifying judicial approval of
mediated agreements, judicial requirement of mediator's report, and opposition to such
required reports as possible approaches to judicial involvement). The flexibility
preserved by these types of provisions could be applied within the same area of law or
even the same case. There might, for instance, be more formal judicial involvement in
a divorce proceeding when child custody issues are being mediated than when only
property questions are at issue.
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a case for exclusion. 88 They will be motivated by a genuine belief that
continuation of the status quo in their situation best serves the public or
private interests of parties to mediation, and also perhaps best preserves a
nonparty's special institutional or financial investment in mediation.
Some requests for exclusion will rely on the argument that the interests
at stake are too volatile or weighty to be subjected to prescribed mediation
standards and procedures. Family violence is an existing example
predicated on volatility; many states that require mediation in domestic
relations cases have created exceptions for situations involving domestic
violence.8 9 Environmental disputes affecting the public at large may
become an example based on the importance of the interests at stake.
Recently, the chairman of the Sierra Club expressed serious reservations as
to the wisdom of submitting to local mediation conflicts regarding
management of natural resources. 90 He voiced concerns that a largely urban
environmentalist constituency is geographically too remote to participate in
power-sharing through local mediations, that the disparity in mediation-
related skills and resources between industry representatives and local
environmentalists will be disabling over the long term, and that it is too
difficult psychologically to negotiate with the opposition while
simultaneously attacking in public their harmful proposals. 9' Regardless of
how persuasive one finds these concerns to be, their expression raises the
prospect that national environmental groups may seek broad exemptions
from mandatory mediation coverage under a uniform or model act.
Other requests for exclusion may rest on the claim that the interests at
88 Cf. Asimow, supra note 27, at 304-307 (recounting efforts by two state
agencies to be excluded from coverage under California's new Administrative
Procedure Act).
89 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-6-20(e) (1996 & Supp. 1997); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3170(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). See generally ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note
2, § 7:02 nn.27-28 and accompanying text.
90 See Michael McCloskey, The Limits of Collaboration, HAUPER'S MAG., Nov.
1996, at 34-36 [hereinafter The Limits]; Michael McCloskey, The Skeptic:
Collaboration Has Its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 7 [hereinafter
The Skeptic].
91 See The Limits, supra note 90, at 35-36; The Skeptic, supra note 90, at 7; see
also Jon Margolis, How a Foe Saved the Quincy Library Group's Bacon, HIGH
CoUNTRY NEwS, Sept. 29, 1997, at 13 (reporting that timber industry outmaneuvered
local environmentalists in their collaborative approach to a logging dispute, and that
national environmental groups stepped in to redress the inequity while expressing
discomfort over the local collaboration).
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stake are too trivial to trigger uniform standards or procedures. Here one
might imagine a high school cheerleader angered at being left off the travel
squad, or a prisoner objecting to the drab new color scheme in his cell
block. When such disputes arise outside the court system, they may raise
the question of whether prisons or school boards should be exempted at
least from mandatory aspects of a mediation act. This is not meant to
suggest that a uniform or model mediation law should succumb to any or all
such requests for exclusion. It is, however, distressingly easy at times to
make a draft act's supporters look ridiculous by forcing them to defend
statutory coverage that appears either insufficiently sensitive to major
public values or excessively burdensome in the way it would apply. 92
An alternative to requests for total exclusion will be efforts to secure
contracting-out provisions whereby parties may agree to different
procedures or standards than what the statute requires or recommends. In at
least one state, the law already allows parties to a mediation to agree that
they will not follow otherwise mandatory provisions. 93 In some instances a
voluntary opt-out arrangement may be attractive because it furthers the
consensual or shared interests of the parties. The danger is that the parties
may not be equally aware of what their interests are or equally capable of
protecting them. Inequalities of information or resources may complicate
efforts to assess these so-called voluntary requests for exclusion.
My final observations involve the legislative process. Without meaning
to suggest that in law or life there is more to be learned from failure than
success, I offer here two thumbnail sketches of promising Conference acts
that have fallen flat in the state legislative arena. One-an old failure-is
the Uniform Divorce Act of 1907, thoughtfully analyzed by Professor
James White in a 1991 article. 94 The uniform act arose in response to
widely held perceptions that divorce laws had become too relaxed and that
migratory divorce-fueled by uneven standards between states-was a
substantial contributing factor.95 The Conference would have restricted
divorce both by modestly tightening general standards and by significantly
burdening the option of obtaining a divorce in another state. 96 The Act had
the approval of churches and the turn-of-the-century women's movement as
9 See Asimow, supra note 27, at 308-309.
93 See FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.720(f)(1) (1997) (allowing parties to a mediation to select
a mediator who does not satisfy the state's certification requirements).
94 See White, supra note 31, at 2120-2133.
95 See id. at 2108-2109.
96 See id. at 2121-2122.
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well as enthusiastic support from two Presidents, and it enjoyed a
considerable media following. 97 Yet only three states adopted the 1907 Act,
and the Conference withdrew it in 1928. 9 8
The other failure- of more recent vintage-is the Model Employment
Termination Act of 1991 (META). 99 The model act was promulgated in
response to general agreement that common law regulation of wrongful
discharge in the workplace was too onerous for employees and too risky
and unpredictable for employers. The commissioners solicited substantial
input from a range of interest groups and drafted an act that established a
relatively objective "good cause" standard, recommended arbitration as a
cheaper and more informal adjudicatory method, and in general sought to
offer employees better prospects for relief and lower transaction costs in
exchange for lesser amounts of monetary recovery and the sacrifice of their
common law tort options. 100 META has been introduced in about ten states,
has been seriously considered in only one or two, and has not been enacted
by any state. 101
What lessons do these two failures suggest in terms of the process of
securing widespread legislative enactment? One is the requirement for an
articulate and forceful presentation as to why a uniform or model act is
needed. Despite Conference assertions that migratory divorce was a major
problem and that stronger law would diminish rates of divorce, scholarly
opponents relied on public data to show that migratory divorce was of little
impact and imperfect legislation was not a principal cause of rising divorce
rates. 102 In the mediation context, it is important to be clear as to why a
model or uniform act is needed. If promoting best practices and establishing
predictable direction out of current confusion or chaos are key rationales,
97 See id. at 2107-2123.
98 See id. at 2107, n.44 and accompanying text.
99 MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 1991).
100 See St. Antoine, supra note 38, at 367-370; Theodore J. St. Antoine, The
Model Employment Termination Act: Fairness for Employees and Employers Alike,
1992 LAB. L.J. 495, 495-500 [hereinafter Fairness for Employees].
101 See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will:
Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1506 n.384 and
accompanying text (1996) (META introduced in Hawaii in three different legislative
sessions and in Massachusetts and Oklahoma in two different sessions); St. Antoine,
supra note 38, at 380 (META introduced in about ten states); CONFERENCE FACT
SHEET, supra note 12 (META not enacted by any state).
102 See White, supra note 31, at 2123, 2128-2129.
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that case should be made with rigor and some specificity.
Second is the importance of soliciting and receiving input from all
interested and affected parties-which means knowing who those parties
are. With respect to the divorce act, the Conference heard from concerned
elites but not from the large number of men and women who were
uncomfortable with or opposed to restrictions on their access to divorce. 103
When advocates assert the moral righteousness of their position (as
occurred in the divorce act setting), they may shame their opponents into
silence-but that silence should not be misconstrued as assent or
acquiescence. 104 Proponents of a mediation act presumably will not project
a sense of moral superiority that stifles debate by shaming the opposition,
but they do need to be prepared to delve into the silences. By reaching out
to affected persons or interests underrepreseinted in the private legislative
process, supporters improve their chances of avoiding unpleasant surprises
when a model or uniform act reaches the state legislatures.
A third and final lesson is to understand early the major flashpoints that
may divide two or more key interested players, and to maintain regular
communication with all sides to such disputes. In the case of META, the
Conference built a solid foundation-employer and employee groups had
grown weary of the patchwork common law response and wanted a more
rational statutory approach to wrongful discharge. 105 At some point in the
drafting process, though, the tilt toward employer interests became too
strong. It may have been the limitation imposed on recovery of damages for
bad-faith terminations, 106 or the extent to which parties could waive the
model act's basic arbitration scheme107 or even contract out of the good
103 See id. at 2128.
104 See id. at 2126-2128.
105 See St. Antoine, supra note 38, at 380-381 (describing AFL-CIO decision in
1987 to support concept of statutory solution to unjust dismissal); Fairness for
Employees, supra note 100, at 497 (describing employers' discomfort at random and
often excessive jury verdicts in common law wrongful discharge actions).
10 6 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT § 7(b), 7A U.L.A. 93 (Supp.
1991); St. Antoine, supra note 38, at 375 (describing how employers prevailed on
damages limitations in the Conference drafting committee).
107 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT § 4(i), 7A U.L.A. 90 (Supp.
1991); St. Antoine, supra note 38, at 377 (describing how employers secured
amendment at the 1991 annual meeting allowing parties to contract for private dispute
resolution procedures).
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cause standard altogether. 108 Whatever the reasons, the interest groups
representing employees seem to have quietly but resolutely walked away
from the finished product after participating constructively in the early
drafting process.' 09 Obviously it is not possible at this point to know which
mediation issues will elicit strongly divided views from major interested
groups or will trigger special concern from groups that are leery of a
uniform or model act approach. Anticipating those issues in advance may
be less important than reacting to the disagreements and trying to keep all
important players invested in the act as it evolves in the months or years to
come.
IV. CONCLUSION
After more than a century of uniform state law activity, it seems safe to
observe that there is no yellow brick road to widespread enactment.
Decisions about what to include and omit from a uniform or model
mediation act will be determined primarily through considered debate as to
the merits of particular mediation law issues, rather than through reliance
on general characteristics of the uniform law process. That is as it should
be: uniform commissioners, whose status and tenure do not depend on
partisan promises or campaign contributions, are in many respects better
prepared than other legislators to approach the ideal of an informed and
deliberative lawmaking process.
This Article has maintained, however, that attention to certain aspects
of the uniform statutory approach may well enhance efforts to develop and
disseminate a well-conceived mediation statute. Drafters and supporters
should decide on the basic rationales underlying a mediation act and then
state those objectives with conviction-in the "purpose" section of the
statute and elsewhere. Given that some mediation issues may require
uniform statutory treatment while others would benefit from a more pliable
108 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT § 4(c), 7A U.L.A. 89 (Supp.
1991); St. Antoine, supra note 38, at 379 (describing how drafting committee allowed
parties by express agreement to dispense with statutory good cause protections and
replace them with a mandatory severance payment scheme).
109 See St. Antoine, supra note 38, at 381 (noting change of position by AFL-
CIO). Professor St. Antoine points out that the employer community's support for
widespread enactment of META has been less than outspoken, perhaps because
employers believe they can continue to take advantage of the current legal system. See
id.; see also Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 849, 902-920 (1994) (criticizing
META as inadequate and stacked against employees).
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legislative response, proponents should look toward a two-tiered approach
that sets forth consistent rules or standards for certain core matters yet
creates options or guidelines for many additional "legislatable" subjects.
With regard to the Conference's internal enactment process, drafters should
be prepared to respond to forceful interest group requests for exemption
from coverage or, in the alternative, for "contract out" provisions. They
also should try to anticipate major controversial issues and should resist the
temptation to cofistrue interest group silence as assent particularly with
respect to groups that may be underrepresented in the Conference
enterprise. Finally, with respect to post-Conference lawmaking
developments, it is important to define success broadly-wholesale
approval from state legislatures is surely welcome, but so too are partial
enactments and evolving acceptance through the law schools and courts.
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APPENDIX
















Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Year # States Enacting Total # States States
1969 1 1 ND
1973 5 6 CA, CO, HI, OR, WY
1975 3 9 MD, MI, WI
1976 1 10 DE
AK, FL, ID, IN, IA, MN, MT, NY,
1977 10 20 OH, PA
AZ, CT, GA, KS, LA, MO, RI,
1978 8 28 SD
AR, IL, ME, NE, NV, NH, NJ,
1979 12 40 NC, TN, VT, VA, WA
1980 4 44 AL, KY, OK, UT
1981 3 47 NM, SC, WV
1982 2 49 MS, VI
1983 3 52 DC, MA, TX
Source: UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT,
9 U.L.A. (Part 1) 117-118 (Supp. 1997)
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Uniform Controlled Substances Act
0 1::,
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Year
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
Year # States Enacting Total # States States
1967 1 1 CT
1970 4 5 MD, NJ, SD, VA
AL, AR, ID, IL, IA, MA, MN,
MS, MO, NE, NV, NC, ND,
OK, PR, SC, TN, UT, VI, WA,
1971 23 28 WV, WI, WY
CA, DE, HI, KS, KY, LA, NM,
1972 9 37 NY, PA
1973 3 40 FL, MT, TX
1974 2 42 GA, RI
1975 2 44 ME, OH
1976 1 45 IN
1977 1 46 OR
1978 1 47 MI
1979 1 48 AZ
1981 2 50 CO, DC
1982 1 51 AK
Source: UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. (Part III) 1-2 (1997)












Year # States Enacting Total # States States
1953 1 1 PA
1957 1 2 MA
1958 1 3 KY
1959 2 5 CT, NH
7' 1960 1 6 RI
AR, IL, NJ, NM, OH, OK, OR,
1961 8 14 WY
1962 4 18 AK, GA, MI, NY
CA, IN, ME, MD, MO, MT, NE,
1963 10 28 TN, WV, WI
1964 1 29 VA
AL, CO, DC, FL, HI, IA, KS, MN,
1965 15 44 NC, ND, NV, TX, UT, VI, WA
1966 5 49 DE, MS, SC, SD, VT
1967 2 51 AZ, ID
1974 1 52 LA
____ 
_ Source: U.C.C., I U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1997)
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NO NO , f . N-,; N, N4 ',b ', , ',' b , "9 NO , O ,
Year
Uniform Arbitration Act
Year # States Enacting Total # States States
1957 2 2 FL, MN
1959 1 3 WVY
1960 1 4 MA
1961 2 6 IL, MI
1962 1 7 AZ
1965 2 9 MD, "TX
1967 1 10 ME
1968 1 11 AK
1969 3 14 AR, IN, NV
1971 2 16 NM, SD
1972 1 17 DE
1973 2 19 IKS, NC
1975 2 21 ICO, ID
1977 1 22 DC
1978 2 24 OK, SC
1980 2 26 MO, PA
1981 1 27 IA
1983 1 28 TN
1984 1 29 KY
1985 3 32 MT, UT, VI
1986 1 33 VA
1987 2 35 NE, ND
Source: UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. (Part 1) 1 (1997)
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Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
Year # States Enacting Total # States States
1953 1 1 WA
1955 1 2 OR
1965 3 5 PA, WI, WY
1968 1 6 OK
1969 2 8 CO,ND
1970 2 10 KS, NY
1971 1 11 AZ
1972 1 12 AK
1973 1 13 CT
1974 1 14 ID
1975 2 16 ME, SD
19761 17 [N
197 1 16 MN
979- 2 20 IA, NV
1981 1 21 iX
1983 3 24 HI, UH, UI
1984 2 26 FL,MS
1985 2 28 _A, RI
1986 3 31 AL, DE, GA
198 1 32 MD
T988 2 34 MO, VA
1989 5 39 AR, MT, NM, NC, WV
1990 2 41 DC,KY
1991 1 42 IL
1992 1 43 VI
1993 2 45 NE,SC
1994 1 46 NH
Source: UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT,
113 U.L.A. 13-14 (Supp. 1997)
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Year # States Enacting Total # States States
1915 2 2 PA, WI
1916 1 3 MD
1917 4 7 AK, IL, MI, TN
1918 1 8 VA
1919 3 11 ID, NJ, NY
1921 2 13 MN, U1
1922 1 14 MA
1923 1 15 SD
1929 1 16 CA
1931 2 18 CO, NV
1939 1 19 OR
1941 3 22 AR, NC, VT
1943 1 23 NE
1945 1 24 WA
1947 1 25 DE
1949 3 28 IN, MO, OH
1950 1 29 SC
1954 2 31 AZ, KY
I955 1 32 OK
1957 2 34 RI, VI
1961 1 35 Ix
1962 36 DC
1971 2 38 AL, IA
1972 3 41 FL, HI, KS
1973 2 43 ME, NH
1976 1 44 MS
1__984 1 45 GA
Sources: UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1914), 6 U.L.A. 79 (Supp. 1997),
not including UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994), 6 U.L.A. 1 (1995);

